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Shoaff: State v. Nemeth

STATE v. NEMETH 1
EQUAL PROTECTION FOR THE BATTERED CHILD
"I'm disgusted with the shit you turned out to be. . . . I don't care
what I have to do, I'm going to get rid of you . . . you bastard."2
I. INTRODUCTION
The "equality of men in legal right is a most sacred principle" that must never be
abridged by our political structure.3 This principle is embodied in the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment4 to the United States Constitution which guarantees
"the protection of equal laws"5 to all citizens. The equal protection clause ensures that the
government does not enact legislation which discriminates against a class of individuals
by treating similar persons differently,6 on a purely illogical and arbitrary basis.7 When
the government takes such action, the courts should step in to review the constitutionality
of the governmental action under the equal protection clause.8
In State v. Nemeth, the Seventh District Court of Appeals was asked to decide whether
16-year-old Brian Nemeth should be permitted to introduce expert psychological
testimony to support his claim of self-defense for the shooting death of his mother.9 The
Court recognized that the battered child and battered woman syndromes are analogous
conditions.10 Therefore, since Ohio allows battered women to present expert testimony of
the battered woman syndrome to support their claims of self-defense,11 the Nemeth Court
reasoned that battered children should be afforded the same right under the Equal
Protection Clauses of the United States and Ohio Constitutions.12
This Note analyzes the Court's decision in Nemeth.13 Part II presents a background of the
battered child syndrome followed by a discussion of the admissibility of battered woman
and battered child syndrome testimony in Ohio.14 In addition, it contains a brief overview
of Ohio's ambiguous self-defense standard.15 Part III presents the facts, procedural
history, and holding of Nemeth.16 Part IV analyzes the Court's holding.17
This Note establishes why the Ohio Supreme Court should recognize the psychological
equivalency of the battered woman and battered child syndromes and affirm the Nemeth
holding on equal protection grounds. In doing so, the Court will ensure that abused
children enjoy the same evidentiary right as abused women. Namely, the right to present
expert psychological testimony to support their self-defense claims.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Battered Child Syndrome
"In recent years, experts have declared the child abuse and neglect problem an
epidemic."18 Two-and-a-half million children each year are victims of serious abuse.19
Since 1980, the number of reported cases of child maltreatment has quadrupled.20 While
the majority of abused children do not retaliate against their attacker,21 a small percentage
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are forced to commit parricide22 in self-defense.23 To understand why a child would use
deadly force against his abusive parent, one must understand the psychological effects of
the abuse on the child's perceptions and behavior.
Originally, most child abuse researchers focused their attention on the medical rather than
psychological aspects of abuse.24 In 1962, Dr. C. Henry Kempe and associates coined the
term "battered child syndrome" in a landmark study published in the Journal of the
American Medical Association.25 Kempe used the term to describe the clinical
presentation of young children who had received serious physical abuse at the hands of
their parents.26
Since Kempe's study, a huge body of research on the psychological characteristics of
child abuse has emerged.27 This research illustrates the identical psychological features of
the battered child and battered woman syndrome.28 Abused women and children both
suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD),29 a condition that results from a
psychologically traumatic event that is outside the range of normal human experience,
such as severe abuse.30 Both exhibit a wide array of psychological disturbances ranging
from fear, aggression, and hostility to "learned helplessness,"31 apathy, and withdrawal.32
Both become psychologically attached33 to their batterers and fear reprisal should they
attempt to escape the abusive relationship.34 These factors, coupled with a child's
complete dependence on his parent for financial and emotional support,35 explain why the
battered child cannot comprehend an escape from his life of abuse,36 other than by killing
his abuser.37
Abused children, like their battered women counterparts, often kill their abusers during a
lull between attacks, in a so-called nonconfrontational period.38 After enduring years of
repeated abuse, a battered child learns how to detect subtle changes in his abuser's
behavior; this condition, termed "hypervigilance," alerts the child that an attack is
imminent.39 Facing the threat of danger, the child believes that he must act now, inbetween attacks, or suffer the consequences of an impending, perhaps fatal beating.40
Without the aid of expert testimony to describe the child's "hypervigilant" state of mind,
the average juror is simply unequipped to understand why the child believed that an
attack was imminent, absent an objectively apparent reason for such a belief.41
B. Admissibility of Expert Psychological Testimony of the Battered Woman and
Battered Child Syndromes in Ohio.
Over the last two decades, Ohio has gone from refusing to recognize the battered woman
syndrome to allowing experts to testify concerning the syndrome to help the jury evaluate
the woman's unique self-defense claim.42
In 1981, the Ohio Supreme Court unanimously denied admissibility of expert testimony
of the battered wife syndrome in State v. Thomas. 43 The defendant in Thomas sought to
introduce expert testimony on the battered wife syndrome to help the jury understand her
state of mind when she shot her abusive husband.44 The Court held that the battered wife
syndrome had not gained sufficient scientific acceptance to warrant admissibility and that
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the jury was competent to understand whether the defendant presented a self-defense
claim without the aid of an expert.45
Nine years later, in State v. Koss,46 the Ohio Supreme Court reversed its holding in
Thomas. In Koss, the Court found that expert testimony47 concerning the battered woman
syndrome was necessary to assist the jury in determining whether the defendant had
reasonable grounds for an honest belief that she was in imminent danger and that the use
of force was her only means of escape.48 The Court based its holding on the fact that the
battered woman syndrome had gained wide-spread scientific acceptance since Thomas
was decided.49 Furthermore, the court noted that expert testimony was essential to dispel
common myths that lay persons have concerning battered women.50 More importantly,
the Koss Court recognized that knowledge of a battered defendant's state of mind was
crucial to the jury's determination of whether he or she properly acted in self-defense.51
Shortly before Koss was decided, the General Assembly introduced H.B. 484, later
codified as Revised Code 2901.06, the battered woman statute.52 This statute recognizes
the validity of the battered woman syndrome, acknowledges that the syndrome is outside
the understanding of the general public, and allows battered women to introduce expert
testimony to satisfy the requisite belief of an imminent danger of death or great bodily
harm that is necessary to establish the affirmative defense of self-defense.53
Ohio courts have had little occasion to address self-defense claims by battered children.54
The first case to consider this issue was State v. Holden.55 In Holden, the child-defendant
killed his father with an ax.56 Claiming self-defense, the defendant argued that the trial
court erred when it refused to allow a psychiatrist to testify regarding the "battered person
syndrome."57 The Eighth District Court of Appeals held that it was "unable to discern a
distinction between a 'battered wife syndrome' and a 'battered person syndrome.'"58 But,
since the case was decided before Koss, the court was bound by its decision in Thomas to
exclude the expert's testimony on the battered person syndrome.59 In State v. Young,60
the Sixth District Court of Appeals had to decide whether the trial court erred when it
allowed the State to introduce expert testimony attacking the battered child syndrome to
rebut expert testimony presented by the defense.61 The court concluded that expert
testimony was necessary to assist the trier of fact in determining the battered defendant's
state of mind at the time of the killing.62
C. Ohio's Conflicting Self-Defense Standard
In State v. Koss, the Ohio Supreme Court stated that Ohio uses a purely subjective test to
evaluate whether a defendant properly acted in self-defense.63 However, just recently, in
State v. Thomas,64 the Court declared that the second element of self-defense65 is a
"combined subjective and objective test."66 While Thomas is replete with language
purporting to adopt an objectively reasonable standard of self-defense,67 the Court's
opinion nonetheless begins with a statement that the second element of self-defense
requires that the defendant show he had a "bona fide belief" of imminent danger - a
purely subjective standard.68
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In light of this ambiguity,69 this Note suggests that the High Court clarify whether Ohio's
self-defense standard is purely subjective, or whether it contains an objective component
as well. Regardless of what standard is adopted, evidence of a battered defendant's state
of mind is necessary to assist the trier of fact in determining whether the defendant had an
honest and objectively reasonable belief that he was in imminent danger of harm when he
killed his abuser.70
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Facts
On Friday, January 6, 1995, 16-year-old Brian Nemeth was afraid to go home because
once again his mother, Suzanne, was drunk.71 Brian had been the victim of Suzanne's
beatings and verbal abuse for as long as he could remember and tonight was no
exception.72 When Brian arrived home, Suzanne hit him in the mouth with a full can of
beer and threatened to "beat his face in."73 Brian tried to escape by climbing out the
window to go to a friend's house for safety, but she followed him.74 On their ride home,
Suzanne repeatedly slapped Brian and called him a "prick, fag, asshole, dickhead and
mother fucker."75 Upon returning home, Brian locked himself in his bedroom while
Suzanne proceeded to beat on his door for hours, threatening to kill him.76 Finally, when
it appeared that she had stopped, at approximately 4:45 a.m., January 7, 1995,77 Brian
grabbed his hunting bow and shot his mother in the head five times while she was laying
on the couch.78 Suzanne Nemeth died eight days later and Brian was charged with her
murder.79
B. Procedure
The Grand Jury indicted Brian and charged him with one count of aggravated murder.80
He pled not guilty and the trial began on September 28, 1995 in the Jefferson County
Court of Common Pleas.81 Prior to trial, the State filed a motion in limine to prevent the
defense from introducing expert testimony concerning the battered child syndrome82 by
Dr. James Eisenberg.83 The trial court granted the motion on the basis that Ohio does not
recognize the battered child syndrome.84 Brian was subsequently found guilty of
murder.85
Defense counsel appealed to the Seventh District Court of Appeals, asserting two
assignments of error.86 This Note deals with the defendant's first assignment of error in
which he alleges that the trial court erred in excluding the defendant's proffer of expert
testimony of the battered child syndrome to establish his claim of self-defense.87
C. Holding
In a unanimous decision, the appellate court found that battered women and battered
children are similarly-situated for purposes of the equal protection clause.88 Accordingly,
the court held that because Ohio allows abused women to present expert testimony to
establish their self-defense claims, the same opportunity should be afforded battered
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children.89
IV. ANALYSIS
There are four reasons why the Ohio Supreme Court should affirm the Nemeth holding
on equal protection grounds. First, the uncontroverted similarities between abused
women and children make any distinction between the two groups wholly arbitrary.90
Second, Ohio's battered woman statute is underinclusive91 because it excludes battered
children. Third, expert psychological testimony of the battered child syndrome is needed
to assist the jury in assessing the honesty and reasonableness of the child's belief of
imminent danger.92 Fourth, such testimony satisfies the admissibility requirements of
Rule 702 of the Ohio Rules of Evidence.93
The equal protection clauses of the United States and Ohio Constitutions guarantee that
similarly-situated persons receive equal treatment under the law.94 A statutory
classification must be rationally related to a legitimate state interest to be constitutional.95
Otherwise, the classification is arbitrary96 and violates the equal protection clause.97
The Nemeth court wisely concluded that it is "illogical and arbitrary" to treat abused
women and children differently because both groups exhibit identical psychological
responses.98 This Note, with much support from numerous courts and commentators,
agrees with Nemeth concerning the profound similarities between abused women and
children.99
In the landmark case of State v. Janes,100 the Washington Supreme Court declared that
"the battered child syndrome is the functional and legal equivalent of the battered woman
syndrome."101 Likewise, in State v. Holden, the Eighth Appellate District of Ohio stated
that it could not distinguish between a battered woman and a battered person.102 Even the
majority in Jahnke, which held that battered child syndrome testimony is inadmissible to
establish the reasonableness of the child's self-defense claim,103 stated that "conceptually
there is no reason to distinguish a child [from a battered woman] who is a victim of
abuse."104
As these opinions illustrate, the psychological effects that plague battered women are also
indigenous to battered children.105 Both are victims of long-term abuse and both suffer
feelings of learned helplessness, fear, and isolation.106 Likewise, both the battered woman
and battered child syndromes are rooted in abuse-induced post traumatic stress
disorder.107 In light of these analogies, the Nemeth court's decision to treat battered
women and children similarly108 is well-founded and consistent with equal protection
principles.
Nemeth, however, could have gone further and held that R.C. 2901.06109 is
underinclusive110 because it excludes battered children from receiving the evidentiary
benefit of expert testimony authorized by the statute.111 Abused women and children are
similarly-situated, especially when it comes to the need to introduce expert testimony to
support their self-defense claims. The legislative intent behind the enactment of R.C.
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2901.06 was to allow battered women to present experts to dispel myths of jurors
concerning battered women112 and to help the jury determine the honesty and
reasonableness of the accused's perception of imminent danger.113
These same purposes apply with equal force to battered children. Absent expert
testimony, the average juror would be unable to comprehend why an abused child could
not escape the abusive environment or otherwise seek help.114 Likewise, without expert
testimony concerning the child's unique state of mind at the time of the killing,115 the lay
juror would be unable to fairly judge the reasonableness of the child's belief that he was
in imminent danger.116 Because battered women and children are similarly-situated for
purposes of 2901.06, the General Assembly's decision to exclude battered children from
the statute117 rendered it underinclusive.118 To cure this defect, the Ohio Supreme Court
must expand the scope of R.C. 2901.06 to encompass battered children.
Expert testimony of the battered child syndrome is crucial to the jury's determination of
whether the abused child honestly and reasonably believed himself to be in imminent
danger when he acted against his abuser.119 Likewise, such testimony comports with the
admissibility requirements set forth in Rule 702 of the Ohio Rules of Evidence.120
An expert on the battered child syndrome can explain characteristics to the jury that are
unique to victims of abuse which lie outside the jury's common knowledge.121 Indeed,
many jurisdictions have concluded that "the pattern of behavioral and emotional
characteristics common to the victims of battering lies beyond the ken of the ordinary
juror and may properly be the subject of expert testimony."122 In a recent decision dealing
with sexual child abuse, the Ohio Supreme Court acknowledged that "most jurors would
not be aware in their everyday experiences of how . . . abused children might respond to
abuse."123
Expert testimony can also counteract prevailing myths and stereotypes concerning
battered persons124 and educate the jury of what perceptions are "reasonable for the
battered person" to have.125 Further, an expert can explain to the jury how the effects of
repeated batterings shape the perceptions of the battered child causing him to "sense"
impending danger even during periods of apparent calmness.126 Absent such testimony,
the lay juror would fail to understand how the battered child reasonably believed himself
to be in imminent danger, particularly when his abuser was in a nonconfrontational
posture at the time of the killing.127
Finally, expert testimony of the battered child syndrome is based on reliable specialized
information.128 In determining the reliability of expert testimony, the Ohio Supreme
Court first inquires whether the evidence is relevant, and then balances its probativeness
and reliability against the risk of misleading or confusing the jury.129 Testimony by an
expert with specialized knowledge of the battered child syndrome is highly relevant to
the jury's determination of the reasonableness of the child's self-defense claim.130
Moreover, such testimony has significant probative value because it assists the jury in
determining matters that are beyond its common knowledge.131 Thus, the probativeness
of battered child syndrome testimony far outweighs any prejudicial impact such
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testimony may have on the jury.132
In sum, expert testimony of the battered child syndrome comports with the admissibility
requirements of Rule 702 and must be admitted to inform the jury of the child's unique
state of mind at the time of the killing.133 Only then can the jury properly evaluate
whether the child's "seemingly unreasonable behavior may actually have been
reasonable."134
V. CONCLUSION
The Nemeth court confronted the issue of whether expert psychological testimony of the
battered child syndrome should be admitted to support the child's self-defense claim.135
Wisely, the court concluded that no rational basis exists for treating battered women and
children differently.136 An abused child's self-defense claim is "virtually identical" to that
of a battered woman who kills her abuser.137 Thus, the same rationales for applying
expert testimony in the battered women context are applicable to battered children.138 As
one commentator aptly put it, judicial acceptance of the battered women self-defense "not
only pave[s] the way for admissibility of similar evidence regarding battered children, it
mandates such a result."139 Accordingly, the Ohio Supreme Court must affirm Nemeth on
equal protection grounds140 and judicially expand the reach of R.C. 2901.06 to allow
battered children to present expert testimony is support of their self defense claims.
Joseph A. Shoaff
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